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Wendy J. Gordon   
The ‘Why’ of Markets: Fair Use and Circularity 
Jim Gibson is right that courts should be wary of letting the mere presence 
of licensing improperly foreclose the defense of fair use.1 As he says, a court in a 
copyright infringement case should not treat the existence of a market for 
licenses of the work as a factor weighing against the defendant’s claim of fair 
use until the court has examined “why [that] licensing market exists.”2 
However, Gibson fails to distinguish the varying reasons licensing might be 
relevant to a fair use determination. As a result, the solution he proffers—
attributing relevance to licensing only in markets free of excessive risk 
aversion—is both over- and under-inclusive. Ironically, his approach also 
overstates the importance of the existence of markets to the proper 
determination of fair use questions. In the following, I hope to clarify the role 
that market existence should play in fair use.  
Gibson’s article is interesting and well-argued, and its thesis is 
straightforward. Since fair use results can’t be guaranteed in advance, and since 
many creative people can’t distribute their work without the cooperation of 
insurers and other stakeholders who refuse to tolerate even small liability risks, 
many movie-makers, musicians, and other artists purchase licenses to copy 
where a license isn’t legally necessary—where the fair use doctrine would have 
provided shelter from liability had the copyist chosen to rely on the doctrine. 
Yet courts weighing a defense of fair use sometimes ask whether a defendant’s 
use occurs within a copyright owner’s normal and expected market, and 
sometimes weigh the presence of existing markets against fair use. 
The result may be a destructive feedback loop: potential defendants buy 
licenses out of an excess of caution; their unwillingness to test the fair-use 
waters then shrinks the scope of fair use for the next round of litigants; the 
 
1.  See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
882, 947-51 (2007). 
2.  Id. at 948. 
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shrinkage once embedded in precedent then causes even more excessive 
caution; and so on. As Gibson wittily reminds us, the shampoo bottle reads: 
“Lather, rinse, repeat.”3 If taken literally, one would never get out of the 
shower. 
It is easy to overstate the danger. Just as most of us have the common sense 
to know that two lathers are enough, many cases contain articulate judicial 
warnings not to over-rely on licensing data.4 For example, the Second Circuit 
has warned that at least for transformative uses, “a copyright holder cannot 
prevent others from entering fair use markets merely ‘by developing or 
licensing a market . . . .’” 5 But Gibson highlights a threat to fair use that is 
nevertheless real. 
Gibson’s primary solution is to give courts tools with which to identify 
markets that are “rife with risk aversion,”6 and to argue that markets so 
identified should be irrelevant to the fair-use inquiry. Unfortunately, however, 
his article implies the converse: that a licensing practice should be relevant to 
deciding the fair use inquiry, so long as the market arises out of a justifiable 
(rather than an excessively risk-averse) expectation of liability. But, as I will 
show, sometimes the absence of risk aversion should not make a market’s 
existence relevant—and sometimes the presence of risk aversion does not make 
a market’s existence irrelevant.  
Fair use raises the question of whether a particular use should be placed 
under a copyright owner’s control. The issue should embrace two inquiries: 
whether (1) in general or (2) in the particular instance, the liberty to engage in 
the contested copying should be a commodity only available through 
permission and purchase. The defendant has no fair use claim if market 
institutions are the proper locus for allocating the use, and if the particular 
market is working well. By contrast, the defendant’s claim of fair use should 
prevail (1) if the use is one that is of a general type not well allocated through 
markets, or (2) if the particular market is deeply flawed. 
 
3.  Id. at 884. 
4.  Moreover, Gibson understates the importance of the warning the Supreme Court issued in 
Acuff-Rose against relying on permission requests. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994), cited in Gibson, supra note 1, at 948 n.256. 
5.  Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 2006). 
Similarly, in a trademark case, the Ninth Circuit declared that, “[T]he fact that other film 
producers choose to pay Comedy III a fee that they may not have to does not obligate New 
Line to follow suit, if it is not legally obliged to do so.” Comedy III Prod., Inc., v. New Line 
Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000). 
6.  Gibson, supra note 1, at 948-49. In this passage, Gibson also recommends that courts take a 
wary stance toward markets with “holdout potential,” which raises a separate question 
relevant to remedies. 
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At least that is my view. It is acknowledged as such, if somewhat oddly 
restated, in Gibson’s article.7 
How does Gibson’s notion of excessive risk aversion fit into this overall 
structure? I turn first to those contexts where Gibson’s point has the most 
purchase. I then turn to those contexts where it has no purchase at all. 
where risk aversion may be relevant 
On the general question of commodification, we know that there are some 
things (like the freedom to criticize) that simply shouldn’t be sold on any 
commercial market, whether or not such a market could feasibly arise. To 
paraphrase a very wise comment that I remember as Bob Gorman’s: even if all 
ideas could be bought and sold, that wouldn’t make you want to force the 
public to pay before using them. There are strong reasons for not treating 
everything as a commodity. For example, incursions of commercialism and 
bureaucracy can dampen creativity in many domains. 
The courts that ask if a commercial market has arisen in a contested use do 
not adequately explain why they do so. Such courts persist in asking, “Is there 
injury to a market for licensing the contested use?” even though many 
commentators and even some judges recognize the inquiry as circular.8 
Focusing on concerns regarding commodification helps to explain the turn to 
such market evidence and to indicate its proper limits. 
The legal system continually engages in the difficult task of drawing 
dividing lines between “commodity markets,” on the one hand, and alternative 
realms such as “public domain” or “gift,” on the other. The lines are inevitably 
fuzzy. Courts faced with this issue often try to identify community norms 
concerning whether a particular practice should be commodified. This is part 
of what happens in fair use cases. For example, as Lloyd Weinreb points out, 
when the Supreme Court decided in the Betamax case9 that fair use permitted 
VCR owners to record broadcast TV shows for later personal viewing, the 
 
7.  Gibson credits me with writing the “foundational” article on the supposed point that “fair 
use exists to ensure that welfare-enhancing uses of copyrighted material will take place even 
when transaction costs impede consensual market transfers of copyright permissions.” 
Gibson, supra note 1, at 897 & n.55. However much I would enjoy the compliment of being 
foundational, my work has never suggested that fair use exists solely for this one purpose. 
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs 
Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149 (2003); Wendy J. 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case 
and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1627-35 (1982). 
8.  See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of 
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38-39 (1997). 
9.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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Court was probably informed by public feelings about privacy and proper 
behavior.10 
The word “norm” has many meanings. It can indicate, among other things, 
“typical” group behavior, or a group’s belief as to how its members “should” 
behave, or the requirements of an overarching “best” view of ethics and law. 
Usually, a judge is interested in discovering the overarching best view, but in 
the process she will often try to reach a kind of reflective equilibrium with 
community beliefs. In turn, typical behavior ordinarily serves as some evidence 
of the community’s beliefs. 
So, should courts regard licensing behavior as some evidence that the 
community believes the use in question should be undertaken only with a 
license? Not necessarily. We all know instances in which community norms 
have been antithetical to morality. Even in contexts where the norms 
themselves are inoffensive, it is often unwise for law to adopt them.11 Further, 
the community is broader than the market participants; neither all potential 
users nor all people affected by a fair use ruling have expressed their 
preferences through the market.  
Moreover, behavior that responds to law is very unreliable as a guide to 
attitude. When people obey the law, their behavior may merely show that they 
do not object strongly enough, or feel safe enough, to engage in disobedience. 
And here is where Gibson’s point enters: behavior becomes an increasingly less 
reliable indicator of attitude as fear increases. Therefore, if a licensing market 
arises out of excessive risk aversion, an exceptionally broad chasm opens up 
between behavior and beliefs: licensing behavior becomes a particularly 
unreliable guide to what even market participants think the rules should be. 
Thus, in cases where the courts turn to the community for information on 
the general question of whether a use shouldn’t happen without a license, the 
presence of Gibsonian risk aversion is relevant. Gibson’s article rightly plants a 
red flag in such contexts, marking them as situations in which courts should be 
especially careful not to rely upon custom as evidence of community beliefs. 
Here Gibson’s tests for identifying risk-aversive markets are useful. 
 
10.  “The overwhelming fact, of which everyone was aware, is that time-shifting had become for 
the public as well as the programmers an ordinary, proper activity. The millions of viewers 
who taped shows for later viewing . . . . would have regarded any prohibition as an 
interference with their property and privacy.”  Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on 
the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1155 (1990) (citation omitted). 
11.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996). 
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where risk aversion may be irrelevant 
If the defendant’s type of use is generally suitable for commodification, 
copyright will still not deserve enforcement unless the defendant faces a market 
that functions well enough to direct resources to socially desirable ends. There 
are many market defects that can make Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” falter, 
and thus validate fair use in individual cases. One such defect is the presence of 
transaction costs so high that licensing is impractical.  
On the factual question of impracticality, the existence of a market shows 
that for at least some players, transaction cost barriers are surmountable, 
perhaps because new institutions (such as collective rights societies) have 
evolved. Such evidence is necessarily incomplete—what constitutes a “low” 
transaction cost to a player like Google may be an immense barrier to ordinary 
users—but the actual licensing pattern does tell us something about the cost of 
finding bargaining partners, dickering over fees, arranging for monitoring, and 
the like. 
Transaction costs excuse a defendant’s market bypass only if such costs are 
high. If a transaction cost barrier has been lowered—such as through the 
creation of a collective rights organization—it doesn't matter if this happened 
because licensees were excessively risk-averse or for some other reason. So on 
the factual issue of whether the defendant could practicably have licensed, 
excessive risk aversion should be irrelevant. 
a concluding thought 
Some of the force of Gibson’s article may spring from an underlying worry 
that nags at many copyright scholars: that fair use might be misunderstood as 
justified by the presence of transaction costs, and that as transaction costs 
shrink, markets will become more feasible and fair use will disappear. So 
Gibson’s article functions as one of many salutary efforts showing that the bare 
existence of markets should not foreclose fair use. While I applaud such 
articles, it’s important to remember that however refined the courts’ use of 
existing markets becomes, it should never constitute more than a small portion 
of the fair use inquiry, for two reasons. First, the absence of transaction costs 
merely removes one of many possible bases for fair use. I believe that a careful 
rereading of my early work on transaction-cost theory will make that clear. 
Second, any reference to “customary markets” is fraught with danger. Custom 
is unlikely to provide probative evidence about community beliefs when people 
are merely responding to what they fear the law will do. Any licensing done out 
of fear of liability—whether reasonable or excessively risk-averse—is a poor 
guide to what a community believes. 
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